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Saturns for Rickshaws:
The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements*
SAMUEL ESTREICHER*
The casual observer might be forgiven for thinking that the debate over
predispute employment arbitration agreements ended in 1991, when the Supreme
Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.' that the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA)2 requires enforcement of such agreements, even
when they are obtained as a condition of employment, and would preclude
employees or former employees from suing in court on their federal (or state)
statutory discrimination claims. The plaintiffbar, however, proceeded to launch a
decade-long effort to undo Gilmer, meeting with little success everywhere but
the Ninth Circuit. One of the premises of their challenge was the fact that the
Court in Gilmer had not decided the scope of the FAA's section 1 exclusion of
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 3
That legal issue has now been laid to rest with the Supreme Court's decision
in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.4 In Circuit City, the Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit's reading that section 1 excluded all employment contracts from
the FAA's reach, and agreed with the view of the other eleven circuits that such a
broad exclusion cannot be squared with the provision's specific reference to the
employment contracts of "seamen" and "railroad employees." This language, the
Court reasoned, indicates a congressional intention to exclude only employment
* @2001 Samuel Estreicher. Text of remarks at Symposium 2000, Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation: Ten Years After, The Ohio State University College of
Law, Nov. 17, 2000, Columbus, Ohio. A version of this article was initially published with
co-author Jay W. Waks, as Free to Agree?: If Supreme Court Stumbles, Arbitration
Agreementsfor Employment Disputes Could Be Knocked Out, LEGALTIMES OF WASH., Jan.
8, 2001, at 51, 53.
** Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Labor and Employment Law at New
York University School of Law. The author also served as co-counsel for petitioner in the
U.S. Supreme Court litigation, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, referenced in the article.
This article, however, represents the author's personal views and does not necessarily reflect
the views of clients or other organizations with which he is involved.
1 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
3 Id.
4 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).
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contracts of "transportation workers,"5 i.e., other "class[es]" of workers directly
engaged in interstate transportation functions in the same way that seamen and
railroad employees are.
This article leaves for others the question whether the Court correctly
interpreted the scope of the section 1 exclusion. Rather, the focus here is on the
underlying policy debate that undoubtedly influenced the Justices, much as it
influences the opponents of predispute agreements to arbitrate employment
claims.
I. STATES' RIGHTS OR ARBITRATION'S "DEATH KNELL"?
What may seem a technical lawyers' debate over the meaning of words
Congress used in 1925 should not obscure the practical importance of Circuit
City for the future of employment disputes in this country. Presenting themselves
as champions of states' rights and federalism values-no doubt in an effort to
win over hoped-for swing votes, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy-Adams and
his amici (which included a number of state attorneys general) argued that all
that was at issue in Circuit City was whether state or federal law governs the
enforceability of arbitration agreements covering employment disputes. If the
Ninth Circuit's expansive reading of the section 1 exclusion were affirmed, they
insisted, all this means is that states, in keeping with their traditional
responsibility in this area, will be permitted to decide whether arbitration is a
suitable vehicle for resolving employment claims.
Adams's counsel did not highlight for the Justices' benefit during the oral
argument, but which was acknowledged in Adams's papers, plaintiff's position
that even those states that are favorably disposed to arbitration (which now also
include California6) will be able to enforce arbitration agreements only with
respect to state law claims. Most employment disputes, however, involve
challenges to hiring, promotion, and termination decisions that raise both federal
and state law claims. State law would not apply to the federal claims-we are
told in a footnote in Adams's brief-because a "federal antiwaiver rule would
govern by reason of the Supremacy Clause."'7
Although Adams's lawyers did not elaborate, the point is that if the FAA
were not available to enforce arbitration clauses in the employment context,
plaintiffs would argue that federal statutes like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with
5 Id. at *8 ("Section 1 exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of
transportation workers.").
6 See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
7 Respondent's Brief at 40 n. 19, Circuit City (No. 99-1379).
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Disabilities Act, by their terms, contemplate law suits as the exclusive
enforcement mechanism and, as a general matter, preclude prospective waivers
of rights contained therein. Thus, unlike cases where the FAA applies, for
employment cases (had Adams and his amici prevailed) there would be no
countervailing "federal presumption of arbitrability" to be balanced in the
equation.8 Statutory silence on the question of arbitration in federal statutes,
coupled with the general policy of these statutes on prospective, waivers by
employees, would lead to the conclusion that claims under these statutes cannot
be the subject of an enforceable predispute arbitration agreement.
Fortunately, the Circuit City majority was not beguiled by this argument
noting that it could not be squared with Southland Corp. v. Keating,9 which held
"the FAA to apply in state courts, and to pre-empt state antiarbitration law to the
contrary."10 Moreover, -Justice Kennedy's opinion observes, "there are real
benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions," and "[w]e have been clear
in rejecting the supposition that the advantages of the arbitration process
somehow disappear when transferred to the employment context." 11 The
majority then proceeded to address Adams's states-rights contention:
Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit
that may be of particular importance in employment litigation, which often
involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial
contracts. These litigation costs to parties (and the accompanying burden to the
Courts) would be compounded by the difficult choice-of-law questions that are
often presented in disputes arising from the employment relationship,... and
the necessity of bifurcation of proceedings in those cases where state law
precludes arbitration of certain types of employment claims but not others. The
considerable complexity and uncertainty that the construction of§ 1 urged by
respondent would introduce into the enforceability of arbitration agreements in
employment contracts would call into doubt the efficacy of alternative dispute
resolution procedures adopted by the Nation's employers, in the process
undermining the FAA's proarbitration purposes and "breeding litigation from a
statute that seeks to avoid it."1 2
Consider what the American employment landscape would have looked like
had respondent's position prevailed. We could be certain of two things. First, it
8 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Circuit City (No. 99-1379).
9 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
10 Circuit City, 121 S. Ct. at 1312 (citing Southland, 465 U.S. at 16).
11 Id.
12 Id. (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995))
(citations omitted).
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would have taken at least a decade of litigation to decisively resolve the validity
of employment arbitration agreements, during which time the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the plaintiff bar would pursue a new
theory of retaliation discrimination, invocable whenever job applicants are
required to waive their federal rights to a judicial forum as a condition of
obtaining employment. Second, employers would likely have responded to this
legal uncertainty and inability to obtain under state law a complete resolution of
all of the claims arising in a particular employment dispute, by abandoning
employment arbitration entirely. The likely incentives of employers and
employees, were the FAA to drop out of the picture, are illustrated in Table 113.
Table 1. Employer Incentives to Enter into
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements
Probability of Enforcing As a Matter As a Matter of As a Matter of
Arbitration Agreements of Federal State Law: State Law:




1. Federal Claims HIGH HIGH LOW
2. State Claims HIGH HIGH NONE
3. Plausibility of NONE NONE NONE
Retaliation Claim
Against Employer




B. If FAA Had Dropped Out of the Picture
1. Federal Claims NONE LOW NONE
2. State Claims NONE HIGH NONE
3. Plausibility of HIGH LOW HIGH
Retaliation Claim
Against Employer




In other words, what Adams and his amici presented as a state-rights position
in favor of allowing states to fashion their own policies on employment
arbitration would, as a practical matter, end up as a regime that effectively ruled
13 Originally supplied to the editorial writer in Faux Federalism, 4 THE GREEN BAG: AN
ENTERTAINING J. OF LAW 2d 127, 128 (Winter 2001).
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out the use of arbitration as an important option for resolving employment
disputes. Not suprisingly, this result is what the plaintiff bar had been seeking to
accomplish all along, in their campaign essentially to render Gilmer a dead letter
in the employment arena.
II. SHOULD WE CARE?
It may not be in the economic interests of lawyers, narrowly conceived, to
take a favorable view of a dispute resolution mechanism that is considerably less
expensive than litigation. However, as fiduciaries for our clients and citizens of
the polity, we should take a different view, and ask whether the outcome sought
by Adams and his amici is in the best interests of most employees and the larger
society.
A. Cadillacs for the Few, Rickshaws for the Many
In a world without employment arbitration as an available option, we would
essentially have a "cadillac" system for the few and a "rickshaw" system for the
many. The unspoken (yet undeniable) truth is that most claims filed by
employees do not attract the attention of private lawyers because the stakes are
too small and outcomes too uncertain to warrant the investment of lawyer time
and resources. These claims have only one place to go: filings with
administrative agencies where they essentially languish, for the agencies
themselves lack the staffing (and often even the inclination) to serve as lawyers
for average claimants. The people who benefit under a litigation-based system
are those whose salaries are high enough to warrant the costs and risks of a law
suit undertaken by competent counsel; these are the folks who are likely to derive
benefit from the considerable upside potential of unpredictable jury awards. Very
few claimants, however, are able to obtain a position in this "litigation lottery."
Most plaintiff lawyers understandably value this system because it enables
them to be highly selective about the cases they take on. Moreover, the sheer
costs of defending a litigation and the risks of a jury trial create considerable
settlement value irrespective of the substantive merits of the underlying claim.
Thus, most cases where claimants obtain competent counsel will settle, and at
sufficiently high values to give plaintiff lawyers ample economic rewards
without actually having to try many law suits. Thus, the system works well for
high-end claimants and most plaintiff lawyers, and not very well for average
claimants.
A properly designed arbitration system, I submit, can do a better job of
delivering accessible justice for average claimants than a litigation-based
approach. It stands a better chance of providing Saturns for average claimants, in
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place of the rickshaws now available to the many so that a few can drive
Cadillacs. Average claimants will benefit under an arbitration system because the
lower costs of the forum also mean lower costs for their representatives (which
could include unions). Moreover, unlike litigation where resolutions often come
too late and the process itself is so divisive that reinstatement is rarely
practicable, arbitration holds out the promise of a prompt resolution more
suitable for claims by incumbent employees or even former employees truly
desiring reinstatement.
B. Are Saturns Likely?
What little empirical data we have suggests that properly designed
employment arbitration systems can out-perform court-based litigation systems.
There seems little dispute that because arbitration proceedings tend to be
informal (and quicker), they require less lawyer time and resources. 14 Median
time from filing to disposition is also lower for arbitration over court litigation, as
Table 2 indicates.
Table 2. Median Time from Filing to Disposition
U.S. District Court: All Cases Terminated as of 9/30/99 9 months
U.S. District Court: All Cases From Filing to Trial as of 9/30/99 20 months
Orrick Herrington Study of U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) 24-28
Dispositions from 4/1/97 to 12/1/99 months
Cornell Data Base: Federal Civil Filings Terminated in 1997 334.5 days
(category 24: "Jobs")
Cornell Data Base: State Civil Filings: 413 days
Terminated from 7/1/91 to 6/30/92
Orrick Herrington Study of NYSE/NASD Arbitrations from 1989-2000 16 months
Also, claimants' win-loss ratios are at least as high in arbitration, and some
evidence suggests that claimants win more cases in arbitration than they do in
court (Table 3).
14 Employers generally report lower costs in arbitration. See William H. Howard,
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes 142 (1995) (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Arizona State University) (reporting average cost of $20,000 in arbitration as
opposed to $96,000 in litigation); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE
DIsPuTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS' EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 19 (1997).




Table 3. Plaintiff/Claimant Win Rate
Cornell Data Base: Federal Civil Filings Terminated in 1997 (category 24: 0.124
"Jobs")
Cornell Data Base: State Civil Filings Terminated from 7/1/91 to 6/30/92 0.643
Maltby Data for 1994 Federal Civil Cases 0.149
Maltby Data for AAA 1993-95 Employment Arbitrations 0.63
Bingham-Sarraf Data for AAA Employment Arbitrations Decided between 0.508
1/93 and 6/97 1
Given the current state of empirical work, the dispute narrows down to
whether recoveries in arbitration match results in court, and whether employers
because they are repeat players enjoy some systematic advantage in the process
of selecting arbitrators.
,Table 4. Median Awards/Verdicts (Dollars)
Cornell Data Base: Federal Civil Filings Terminated in 1997 89,000
(category 24: "Jobs")
Orrick Herrington Study of U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) 125,000
Dispositions from 4/1/97 to 12/1/99
Orrick Herrington Study of California Jury Verdicts 1989-1999 289,000
Orrick Herrington Study of NYSE/NASD Arbitrations from 1989-2000 82,100
Bingham-Sarraf Data for AAA Employment Arbitrations:
Decided Between 1/93 and 6/97
Pre-Due Process Protocol 52,737
Post-Due Process Protocol 39,279
Hill Data for AAA Employment Arbitrations:
Decided Between 1/7/99 and 10/20/00
84 Awards 15  34,733
As reflected in Table 4, median awards do seem to be lower in arbitration,
although it is unclear whether cases that are going to arbitration are truly
comparable to cases that proceed to trial and judgment in court. As the plaintiff
bar contends, lower median awards may reflect some disadvantage claimants
face in arbitration that they would not confront in court. On the other hand, lower
awards may reflect a greater reluctance of claimants to settle marginally weaker
claims when a low-cost arbitration option is available, or the fact that average
claimants enjoy greater access to arbitration. Without better empirical studies
than we now have, this cannot be answered as a matter of theory.
On the "repeat player" phenomenon, early work by Professor Lisa
Bingham 16 found that employers sued more than once in arbitration fared better
15 Hill's study finds eighteen additional awards during this period that awarded
equitable remedies, thirteen of which also awarded unspecified monetary relief.
16 See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I
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than employers sued only once. Bingham's study did not control for some rather
obvious variables that may explain positive employer outcomes, such as the size
of the employer and the presence of a personnel department. Moreover, factors
such as size and sophistication also suggest that employers sued more than once
in litigation would fare better than employers sued only once.
Later work by Professor Bingham, 17 looking at a larger sample of AAA
awards rendered after the promulgation of the Due Process Protocol, found a
significantly diminished repeat-player effect. 18 Even more importantly, the study
found no statistically significant "repeat arbitrator" effect, 19 that is, that
employers confronting the same arbitrator in a second case would have a higher
probability of success. The likely absence of a repeat-arbitrator effect is
consistent with the view that the real repeat players in arbitration are not the
parties themselves but the lawyers involved. Moreover, the emergence of an
organized plaintiff's bar, in the form of the National Employment Lawyers
Association, should drive down considerably any claimed systematic advantage
for employers. 20
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997). Bingham's work was based on awards
rendered before the American Arbitration Association (AAA) adopted a set of procedural
safeguards in 1995, often referred to as the "Due Process Protocol." Id.; TASK FORCE ON
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP (1995), reprinted in DIsP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37-39, available at
http://www.adr.org/education/education/protocol.html (May 9, 1995) [hereinafter DUE
PROCESS PROTOCOL].
17 See Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the
Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of
Employment: Preliminary Evidence That Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY'S 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Samuel Estreicher ed.,
forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LABOR].
18 Id. at tbl.4.
19 Id. at tbl.3.
20 Does arbitration provide the same incentives for deterring improper employment
decisions as litigation? Certainly, highly publicized law suits have had an important deterrent
effect in the employment arena, but such law suits occur so infrequently that once the factor
of likely exposure is discounted for the probability of suit, it is not clear what their net
deterrent effect is. Conceivably, arbitration, by making possible more frequent production
of claims even if the median awards (and hence settlement values) are lower, may result in
the same level of deterrence. Moreover, to the extent arbitration relieves the administrative
agencies of the burden of charge processing, agency resources would be freed to pursue
systemic claims.
The Supreme Court recently granted review in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 121 S. Ct.
1401 (2001), to decide whether the EEOC can seek individualized relief on behalf of
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C. The fIlusory Alternative of Postdispute Arbitration
Plaintiff lawyers generally agree that arbitration enjoys advantages over
litigation, but they argue that the choice between these two approaches should be
made only after the dispute has'arisen, not in predispute agreements secured as a
condition of employment. As they might put it, if arbitration is indeed so
desirable, it will be readily accepted by claimants in the postdispute setting.
Hence, employers have no legitimate interest in forcing this choice earlier on.
There is a facial appeal to this contention but one that on further reflection
dissolves from view. I know, from personal experience representing clients and
in my work drafting postdispute arbitration rules for the Center for Public
Resources (a consortium of companies and lawyers that promotes various forms
of ADR), that postdispute arbitration agreements are almost never negotiated.2 1 It
is a chimerical alternative to predispute arbitration agreements.
An understanding of the underlying incentives of employers and employees
makes clear that postdispute arbitration, in all but the rarest cases, will not be
offered by one party or accepted by the other. Say, for example, a termination has
occurred. If the former employee cannot obtain counsel, it is not in the
employer's interest to offer arbitration because the lower costs of arbitration will
make more likely the pressing of a claim that otherwise simply would languish in
the administrative agency. If, on the other hand, the former employee's economic
losses are high enough to attract competent counsel, that lawyer is exceedingly
unlikely (absent unusual circumstances) to proffer arbitration even if the lawyer
charging parties who previously agreed to arbitrate their employment claims. Even if the
Court holds that the EEOC does not have this authority, the agency could still seek such
relief on behalf of individuals who did not enter into valid arbitration agreements, and in any
event could seek injunctive relief enjoining respondent from "discharging individuals and
engaging in any other employment practice which discriminates," and ordering it "to institute
and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment
opportunities for [covered individuals], and which eradicate the effects of its past and
present unlawful employment practices ..... EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805
(4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Professor David Sherwyn of Cornell Universityis assembling data on the incidence
of employment arbitration pursuant to postdispute agreements. See David Sherwyn, Post-
Dispute Offers to Arbitration, in N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 11. Professor
Andrew Morriss's empirical studyofexperience under Montana's wrongful discharge statute
also shows that few postdispute offers to arbitrate are accepted by the other side to the
dispute, even where the statute (MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914 (1999)) imposes attorney's
fees on parties rejecting such offers who do not prevail in litigation. See Andrew Morriss, An
Empirical Evaluation of the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, in 2001
N.Y.U. WORKING ESSAYs IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (David Sherwyn & Michael
Yelnosky eds., forthcoming 2002).
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would prefer not to go to trial. The reason the proffer will not be made is because
it is not in the client's interest to do so, for such a proffer reduces the settlement
value of the case as it takes off the table the in terrorem effect of a jury trial.
By contrast, when arbitration agreements are reached in the predispute stage,
the parties' incentives are notably different. Employers do not know which of
their employees will be claimants, and thus are likely to offer the program to
broad categories of employees. Indeed, it is in the employers' interest to make
the program as broadly available as possible. 22 Similarly, from the employees'
vantage, they have no way of knowing whether they will one day be claimants
and whether their claims will attract the kind of lawyers who can obtain for them
a position in the "litigation lottery." A low-cost, properly designed dispute
resolution system for disputes that are not likely to occur and if they do are not
likely elicit a lawyer's attention looks like a pretty good deal.
D. A Special Arbitration-Only Test for "Voluntariness"?
Plaintiff lawyers would counter at this point that if it is such a good deal then
why require employees to accept the deal. Give employees the option to turn
down arbitration, they might say; only if the employee "voluntarily" accepts
arbitration should a predispute agreement be enforced.
There are at least two problems with this response. First, employers offer
predispute arbitration programs precisely because they hope to avoid the costs
and distraction of litigation. The prospect that enforceability of arbitration
agreements will depend on the outcome of collateral litigation, at the postdispute
stage, over whether the employee's agreement was "voluntary" in some abstract
sense detracts substantially from the value of the arbitration option. Second, it is
unclear what arbitration opponents mean by a "voluntary" agreement. Most
arbitration agreements are executed when employees are initially hired. At that
point in time, the terms of relationship are being set. Those terms include matters
of considerable importance to new hires such as compensation, benefits, job
security and the like. No one argues that agreement on these terms is not
enforceable because the employee's assent is not truly "voluntary," in that if he
were not in need of employment, or desirous of the particular job, he might hold
out for a job that offered more pay, more leisure, or more status. Why should
22 See, e.g., Halliburton Dispute Resolution Plan, DIsp. RESOL. PLAN & RuLES
(Halliburton Co., Del.), June 1999, at 2-3 (Plan "binds the Company, each Employee and
Applicant"; covered "'Dispute' means all legal and equitable claims ... between persons
bound bythe Plan"); Philip Morris USA-Sales Dispute Resolution Program, (Philip Morris




agreement on a properly designed arbitration system be treated differently?
The important point here is that at the initial hiring stage, neither the
employer nor the job applicant have made investments in their relationship.
Employers are shopping for prospective employees with desired skills and traits,
and job applicants are shopping for positions that offer the desired mix of pay,
benefits, working conditions, and training ad promotion opportunity. It is not
clear, from any a priori view, why the mechanism for resolving future disputes is
a term that should be excluded from the contractual bargain. 23
It has been suggested that predispute arbitration agreements are problematic
from the employees' standpoint because they are unable to put a proper value on
the probability of a future employment dispute.24 But it is not clear, as an
empirical matter, why employees are unable to calculate the prospect that, say,
one day they will be terminated for discriminatory or other unfair reasons.
Certainly some information about the firm's employment practices is publicly
available, and the employee has good information about the quality of the skills
and motivation he brings to the job. The employer, too, has to make a difficult
prediction as to whether a particular individual will engage in the necessary
effort level and will fit well within the culture of the firm. How seriously are we
to take these cognitive difficulties? Is it also the view of arbitration's opponents
that terms like severance pay benefits should not be enforced because of ex ante
valuation problems, or that employers cannot adhere to stated promotion policies,
because new hires cannot easily value whether they will one day seek a
promotion for which they are qualified, but which they will not receive for unfair
reasons?
In the final analysis, we see in the plaintiff bar's resistance to predispute
arbitration agreements a reprise of the early common law view that arbitration
promises are disfavored and should be revocable. But was it not the point of the
FAA and state arbitration laws that arbitration agreements should be treated no
differently than other contracts, and should "be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 'the
revocation of any contract?" 25
23 The issue becomes more complicated where employers insist on a predispute
arbitration agreement as a condition of retaining, as opposed to obtaining initial,
employment. Here, employees are likely to have made sunk-cost investments in the job-
whether in the form of investments in firm-specific skills, participation in benefit plans that
reward continued service, or simply taking roots in a particular community.
24 See Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration ofEmployment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 29 (1996).
25 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
HI. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Arbitration agreements, to be enforceable, must be fairly designed not to
result, Gilmer teaches, in employees' waiver of any substantive rights. Here,
there is essentially no disagreement between plaintiff and defense lawyers. As set
forth in the American Bar Association's Due Process Protocol, and as reflected
in the rules of the leading ADR service providers such as the American
Arbitration Association and JAMS, an enforceable program that is intended to
cover statutory employment claims must authorize the arbitrator to apply
statutory law and award statutory remedies if violations are found, including
reasonable attorney's fees (if authorized by the statutes in question).26 Moreover,
the arbitrator should be experienced in employment law, allow some reasonable
opportunity for discovery, and issue a written opinion stating reasons for the
award rendered. Note should also be taken of the decisions of the D.C. Circuit27
and the California Supreme Court28 that require employers to front-load the costs
of the forum, including forum fees and the arbitrator's compensation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Arbitration programs so designed will not be attractive to every employer or
employee in the country, but they should be available as an important option in
the overall mix of fora for resolving employment disputes. Allowing this option
is in the best interest not only of employers but also of most employees, not to
mention overburdened courts that cannot effectively process these fact-sensitive,
emotional disputes (today representing 15% of the federal docket).
As the Supreme Court in Circuit City has now brought the Ninth Circuit in
line with the other Courts of Appeals, I hope we can look forward to the day
when the plaintiffbar will retreat from its oppositional stance and begin to work
cooperatively with defense counsel further to improve the employment
arbitration process and help realize its full potential for improving the quality of
justice in our society.
26 DUE PROcEss PROTOCOL, supra note 16; JAMS, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES
AND PROCEDURES, at http://www.jamsadr.com/employment arb.asp#twenty (Nov. 1, 2000).
27 See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
28 See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
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